William De Vijlder

Central banks’ policies impact demand, activity and therefore inflation, with fluctuating and sometimes long lags. This complicates central bank watchers’ analysis. Recent economic and financial data are key to their work, but do not offer a comprehensive picture. They must be supplemented with prospective analyses based on assumptions about how the economy will respond to monetary impulses.

In his latest press conference, Federal Reserve Chair Powell argued that monetary policy might already be sufficiently restrictive. In future decisions, economic data will be particularly important but this does not imply that the latest data are the only thing that matters. The delayed effects of past rate hikes need to be taken into account, considering that they will only show up in the data published over the following months. This is why in past tightening cycles, the Fed has tended to stop hiking rates although the pace of job creation was still rather healthy and well before the unemployment rate picked up significantly. Today it is torn between inflation that is still well above target and the prospect that past rate hikes and tighter credit standards should weigh on activity in the coming months.

Traditionally, monetary policy focuses on price stability and fiscal policy on other objectives. When inflation is well below (above) target on a sustained basis, this separation of roles implies that monetary policy may need to become extremely accommodative (restrictive). Consequently, interest rates have a large cyclical amplitude, which may have undesirable consequences for the economy and put financial stability at risk. Simulations show that a coordinated approach between monetary and fiscal policy reduces the optimal cumulative amount of rate cuts (hikes). However, putting this into practice would probably be very challenging.

The recent difficulties faced by some US regional banks have reignited the debate about a potential conflict between pursuing price stability and financial stability at the same time. Should central banks, and the Fed in particular, stop tightening their monetary policy in order to maintain financial stability, even while inflation remains high? Or should they stay the course, continuing to increase their policy rates until they are sure that inflation is falling towards the 2% target, but risking destabilising the financial sector? The Fed and the ECB decided to stay the course during their March meeting, emphasizing that banking systems were generally sound, that visibility on the possible fallout from the recent turmoil is too limited and that they were still attentive to inflation risks. Thus, unless the economy cools abruptly, the Fed and the ECB have probably not completely finished with their rate hikes just yet.

Recent data in the US show a resilient economy despite the significant and fast tightening of monetary policy. In the Eurozone, the services sector is a source of resilience. Frustratingly for central banks, inflation has also been resilient. This would call for a strong message of further monetary tightening, were it not that uncertainty about the outlook is high. More than ever, central banks need a robust strategy which takes into account a range of possible outcomes. As a consequence, the message from the FOMC has taken a dovish twist. Reading between the lines, the ECB’s message is also softening, as witnessed by the strong emphasis on data-dependency and the role of financial conditions.

The Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey sheds light on how changes in monetary policy influence banks’ credit standards and expected loan demand. Based on the historical relationships, the latest survey points towards a high likelihood of average negative growth of the volume of company and household investments over the next several quarters. Moreover, recent research shows that since 2009, the maximum impact of monetary policy on inflation may be reached more quickly. Based on the relationship between credit standards, expected credit demand and investments by companies and households, as well as on the possibility that transmission lags have shortened, decisions by the Federal Reserve will more than ever be data-dependent.

Monetary policy influences the economy with long and variable lags. They should be considered when assessing the effects of past rate hikes on inflation and its drivers. Bank lending surveys may act as a leading indicator. Historically, tighter credit standards and weak expected credit demand were followed by slower growth of company investments and households’ housing investments. However, the relationship between credit demand and supply factors and household consumption is very weak. Considering the current relatively tight credit standards and weak expected credit demand, one should expect a negative impact on company investment and housing investments by households over the next several quarters.

During the press conference following the latest governing council meeting, Christine Lagarde insisted repeatedly that moving to a 50 bp rate hike versus 75 bp previously did not represent a pivot, adding that rates still have to rise significantly and at a steady pace. Consequently, the likelihood of a terminal rate higher than 3.00% has increased, which explains the jump in bond yields. The large upward revision of the inflation projections is probably another factor behind the hawkish message. Forecasting inflation several years into the future is a difficult task, even more so in the current environment. It will be interesting to see how the governing council will strike a balance between reacting to inflation data, once they have started to decline, and focusing on the ECB’s medium-term inflation projections in setting its policy.

At which level will the Federal Reserve stop hiking the federal funds rate? The question is hugely important for activity and demand in the US economy as well as for financial markets. During his recent press conference, Fed Chair Jerome Powell remained vague about the reaction function of the FOMC but he did mention that they would be looking at real interest rates. This raises the question which inflation measure to use to move from nominal to real rates. A possible solution is to use the term structure of inflation expectations that is calculated by the Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland. Despite its significant recent increase, the real one-year Treasury yield is still below that reached during previous tightening cycles, with the exception of 2018. Against the background of elevated inflation, it is clear the tightening cycle is not about to end. 

A sum-of-the-parts analysis, which is popular in corporate finance, has made its way in the world of central banking, reflecting concern that the multitude of synchronous rate hikes could have a combined tightening effect that is larger than the sum of its parts. To the extent that inflation in a given country is largely a function of global slack, these hikes could cause an unexpectedly large decline in inflation. Rising import prices due to currency depreciation are another factor because they could force countries to tighten monetary policy. Confidence effects may also play a role, especially at the level of export-oriented companies. To address these risks, central banks could insist that synchronous rate hikes should moderate inflation expectations globally. They should also take into account the spillover effects of the actions of foreign central banks when designing their own course of action.

The tight US labour market plays a crucial role in the effort of the central bank of bringing inflation back to target. Slower growth in labour income should lead to slower demand growth, whereas smaller wage increases will ease pressure on corporate profit margins and reduce the need for companies to charge higher prices. The labour market is characterized by a dynamic interaction between job openings, unfilled vacancies, voluntary departures (quits) and layoffs. In the US, unfilled vacancies and the quits rate have started to decline and one should expect that this dynamic will gather pace, causing a slowdown in wage growth. The question remains to what extent this will bring down inflation, which is why the Federal Reserve’s policy is completely data-dependent.

In recent months, the huge and rising gap between observed and target inflation has confronted central banks with an urgency to act. It could be called the panic phase of the tightening cycle. What followed was a swift succession of significant rate increases. Tightening was frontloaded, rather than gradual, to avoid an unanchoring of inflation expectations. This perseverance phase will be followed by a long wait-and-see attitude once the terminal rate -the cyclical peak of the policy rate- will have been reached. During this patience phase of the monetary cycle, the central bank will monitor how inflation evolves. With the risk of further rate hikes having declined, the government bond market should stabilize, which can have positive spillovers to other asset classes. Likewise, the real economy may also sigh a breath of relief, given the reduction in interest rate risk, unless demand and activity would in the meantime have suffered a lot from higher interest rates.  

The last twelve months, inflation has continued to surprise to the upside, due to a combination of a series of supply shocks (covid-19, disruption and shortages, the war in Ukraine, weather conditions) and the strength of demand, which had been underestimated.

Today, the broad-based nature of inflation and its persistence are the real issues, which reduce the visibility in terms of future inflation developments. Therefore, central banks have decided to change their approach. The theory of inflation and monetary policy has been put aside, the only thing that matters are the data.

The main worry of the ECB and the Fed is that inflation expectations become unanchored and influence pricing decision of companies as well as wage negotiations. Consequently, the central banks’ overriding objective is to slow down demand growth by hiking rates, hopefully helped by the absence of new supply shocks.

At the Jackson Hole symposium, Fed chair Powell and Banque de France governor Villeroy de Galhau have insisted that their responsibility to deliver price stability is unconditional. . It gives a new meaning to ‘whatever it takes’. Faced with uncertainty about the persistence of elevated inflation, the Federal Reserve and the ECB will increase their policy rates to bring inflation under control, whatever the short-run cost to the economy, because not doing enough now would entail an even bigger economic cost subsequently.  Equity markets declined and bond yields moved higher. Tighter financial conditions will help the monetary tightening in achieving the desired slowdown in growth. To what extent this is reflected in the inflation dynamics to a large degree will depend on what happens to the supply side, which is beyond the control of central banks.

The ECB Governing Council has surprised markets by a 50 bp rate hike and by dropping its forward guidance and moving to a data-dependent tightening cycle. This may reflect unease about how quickly the euro area economy might react to the policy moves and about the consequences of uncertainty about gas supply during the winter months. Another key decision was the introduction of the Transmission Protection Instrument (TPI), a tool to address unwarranted spread widening that would weigh on the effectiveness of monetary policy transmission. The data dependency of further rate hikes and the vagueness about the triggers for using the TPI may lead to an increase of the volatility in interest rates and sovereign spreads whereby investors try to understand the ECB’s reaction function.

Next Thursday’s meeting of the ECB Governing Council is eagerly awaited. The rate hike decision has been pre-announced so the more important question is whether the new tool to address unwarranted sovereign spread widening will be unveiled. The rationale for such an instrument is well understood but its design and use raise several questions. One is easy to answer. To avoid a conflict with the monetary policy stance, bond purchases by the central bank would need to be sterilized. The others are more challenging. Where is the threshold to call a spread widening ‘unwarranted’? Should the ECB be clear or ambiguous on this threshold and on its reaction when it would be reached? The final question concerns moral hazard and, hence, conditionality. When the ECB intervenes to address unwarranted spread widening, what are governments supposed to do in return in terms of fiscal policy?

Elevated inflation, if left unaddressed, could cause a de-anchoring of inflation expectations, an increase in risk premia, greater price distortion and hence longer-term costs for the economy. Although at first glance, central banks face a dilemma -hiking interest rates to lower inflation at the risk of causing an increase in unemployment or focusing on the labour market and accepting the risk that inflation stays high for longer-, they can only choose between acting swiftly or face an even bigger challenge later to bring inflation back under control. Recent statements by officials of the Federal Reserve, the ECB and the Bank of England acknowledge the need to act but their decisions and guidance are very different and reflect the differences in the macro environment.     

The FOMC has started a new tightening cycle and its members project 6 additional increases in the federal funds rate this year and 4 more in 2023. This hawkish stance is unsurprising. After all, the policy rate is very low, inflation is exceptionally high and the economy is strong. Given the Fed’s dual mandate, the pace and extent of rate hikes will depend on the evolution of inflation as well as the unemployment rate. Previous tightening cycles suggest that concerns about the risk of an increase in the unemployment rate have played an important role in the decision to stop hiking. The central bank will have to hope that inflation has dropped sufficiently by the time that this risk would re-emerge.