William De Vijlder

2020 will leave its mark in History owing to the economic consequences of the Covid-19 pandemic. The pandemic notably triggered a disruption of the supply-side, led central banks and governments to adjust fiscal and monetary policies to face the crisis.

The Federal Reserve and the ECB have been highly successful in influencing asset prices as part of their effort to cushion the shock to the economy from the Covid-19 pandemic. However, one might wonder whether today’s relief could cause an investor’s headache tomorrow. The difficulty of an exit strategy does not imply that certain monetary tools should not be used in the first place. After all, they do have positive effects. However, the likelihood of a bumpy normalisation process of monetary policy calls for careful preparation by central banks as well as investors. These considerations could become particularly relevant should the recovery in 2021 end up surprising to the upside.

Market action last week largely reflected expectations of how the result of the US elections would shift the balance between fiscal and monetary stimulus. Federal Reserve Chair Powell insisted on the need for more fiscal policy support but also hinted that, if need be, more monetary easing would occur. In the UK a coordinated approach has been adopted. The Bank of England will increase its purchases of government bonds and the government will prolong its income support for employees being out of work. Fiscal policy will remain centre stage for many years to come.

In recent decades, the experience in many countries has been that the decline of the public debt ratio during expansions did not compensate for the increase during recessions. This could end up creating concern about sovereign risk and influence the borrowing cost. Under the assumption of permanent reinvestment of maturing paper, significant holdings by the central bank of government paper as a result of quantitative easing, could limit this risk.
This depends on the interest rate on excess reserves and on whether such a policy ends up generating higher inflation and/or inflation expectations.

Declining effectiveness of monetary policy and increased fiscal policy space make the case for increased public debt issuance in combination with quantitative easing to boost growth. There is concern that such policy coordination would lead to fiscal dominance whereby monetary policy is dictated by considerations in terms of public finances to maintain public debt sustainability. Once the pandemic will be behind us, governments will have the responsibility to improve their public finances. Inaction in this respect would put the burden on the ECB when fighting future downturns. It would be a different type of fiscal dominance.

It appears that the Federal Reserve faced with a high probability that its former strategy could bring about a downward drift of inflation anticipations and the uncertainty about potential negative effects of its new policy for financial stability, has put more weight on the former issue.

Over the past 10 years, fostering inclusive growth has moved higher up the agenda of governments, international institutions and, increasingly, companies. Under Chairman Powell, it has become a key topic for the Federal Reserve through the focus on the heterogeneity of the labour market situation of different socio-economic groups. It has led to the view that pre-emptive tightening based on a declining unemployment rate is unwarranted. On the contrary, it may very well stop people from finding a job.  It will be interesting to see whether other central banks and in particular the ECB in the context of its strategy review, will follow in the Fed’s footsteps.

The outcome of the ECB meeting was eagerly awaited considering the latest inflation data, the strengthening of the euro and the Federal Reserve’s new strategy of targeting average inflation. The implicit message from the ECB President’s press conference was “be patient” on the three areas of concern. Inflation is projected to pick up whilst staying well below the target, the euro exchange rate is being closely monitored and the sheer number of strategy review workstreams implies it will take quite some time before we learn about the outcome in terms of the inflation objective.

The Covid-19 represents a massive disinflationary shock because of the demand shortfall it creates. This has triggered a very strong reaction of central banks across the globe, including the ECB. The ECB’s action –in particular the PEPP- has been successful in maintaining fluid financing, both bank-based and capital-market based. Nevertheless, the ECB has a headache, three actually. Inflation is too low and declining, the strong euro reinforces this development and there is concern that the change in the longer-term goal of the Fed, which will now target inflation averaging 2 percent over time, will complicate matters.

The Fed’s new inflation averaging strategy should have global real and financial spillover effects. The former refer to international trade whereby a more sustained expansion of US GDP should pull along the economies of its trading partners via increased US imports. The financial spillovers are driven by capital flows, monetary policy and risk appetite. These factors are highly intertwined. The new Fed strategy will also force other central banks to revisit their own strategy. This creates an issue for the ECB.

The Federal Reserve has changed its longer-run goals. Going forward, monetary policy will focus on the shortfall of employment from its maximum level, rather than on the deviations from this level. More importantly, the central bank will now seek to achieve inflation that averages 2 percent over time. The announcement implies a more accommodative stance because the timing of the first rate hike is now pushed further into the future. It also means that, eventually, the Fed’s reaction function will become more difficult to read: when will average inflation –a concept that remains to be defined- warrant a policy tightening? Such ambiguity would then lead to increased volatility, unless guidance takes an even bigger role.

The European Council agreement this week on a recovery effort is, inevitably, a compromise but it is nevertheless historical It consists of a combination of grants and loans to member states and is funded by debt issued at the EU-level It sets a precedent for the management of future crisis situations with a better balance between monetary and fiscal policy. The possibility of such a two-pronged approach, reduces economic tail risk, which should structurally support confidence of households, companies and investors. The targeted allocation of the grants to countries which are in greater need, is another historical achievement and should generate a larger multiplier effect.

The EU members have settled an agreement on the recovery fund of historic importance. Although the amount of subsidies has been scaled back from the initial proposal, the EUR 750 bn package still accounts for more than 5 % of EU 2019 GDP. The agreement also sets a precedent that could guide policy in case of future major economic recessions. In addition, the milestones members need to abide by should foster the growth potential and help the green and digital transition.

Following the judgment of the German Constitutional Court on 5 May, the ECB Governing Council needs to demonstrate that the monetary policy objectives of its PSPP are not disproportionate to the economic and fiscal policy effects resulting from the programme. In most cases, monetary, economic and fiscal policies are mutually reinforcing. When assessing whether monetary policy is appropriate, one should take into account the stance of economic and fiscal policy. The necessity to have adequate transmission to all jurisdictions as well as the likelihood and extent of tail risks due to insufficient policy action also play a role in the assessment.

Major central banks have stepped up their efforts to attenuate the economic impact of the pandemic, raising the question whether there is a limit to balance sheet expansion. An asset purchase program (QE) can continue for a long time, given the possibility to broaden the investable universe. Quite likely, asset price distortions and concern about the riskiness of the central bank balance sheet will act as the true constraint. For this reason, a central bank could decide to finance the budget deficit directly, considering that this should have a bigger growth impact for a given expansion of the balance sheet. The real challenge under such a strategy is to keep inflation under control once the output gap is closing.

Clear progress has been made at the European Council meeting this week. The proposals of the recent Eurogroup meeting on the creation of three safety nets have been endorsed. There is agreement to work on a recovery fund intended for the most affected sectors and geographical areas in Europe. Its financing would be linked with the multiannual financial framework. Importantly, Chancellor Merkel has declared that, in the spirit of solidarity, one should be prepared to temporarily pay a higher contribution to the European budget.

The Eurogroup has reached an agreement on bringing EUR 500 bn -4.2% of eurozone GDP- of additional firepower to attenuate the immediate economic impact of the Covid-19 pandemic. Three tools will be used: the SURE programme to temporarily support national safety nets, the EIB guaranteeing lending to companies -in particular SMEs- and a Pandemic Crisis Support via the ESM. The work on the creation of a Recovery Fund to boost European investments will continue. The difficult part will be to agree on its funding.

Recent activity and demand data for China show the huge impact of the coronavirus epidemic. German business expectations have seen an unprecedented monthly drop in March . The drop in the price of oil acts as an additional drag on growth and a source of increased credit risk. The strengthening of the dollar is a source of concern for issuers with foreign currency debt in dollar. Despite swift action of the major central banks and the announcement of increasingly important fiscal policy support in various countries, equity markets have barely reacted: lack of visibility dominates.