William De Vijlder

A conjunction of developments has led in the first semester of the 2021 to a global improvement in business and consumer sentiment in advanced economies. Vaccination campaigns gathered speed while the number of new infections declined. Monetary policy support also played a part as well as fiscal policy. International trade and capital flows created international spillover effects which led to a sizeable improvement in the assessment of export orders.

The first half of the year has seen a broad-based improvement in business and consumer sentiment in advanced economies but elevated levels of business surveys reduce the likelihood of further significant increases. The third quarter is expected to see the peak in quarter-over-quarter GDP growth this year. Nevertheless, over the remainder of the forecast horizon –which runs until the end of next year- quarterly growth is expected to stay above potential. This favourable outlook for the real economy brings challenges for financial markets. Surprising to the upside in terms of earnings will become more difficult. Moreover, there is the question of the inflation outlook. For the time being, both the Federal Reserve and markets are relaxed about it but we should expect that over the coming months, the market sensitivity to growth and inflation data will be higher than normal in view of what they would imply for the Fed’s policy stance.

The labour market should play a crucial role in the recovery through its impact on household income and spending. There are reasons to be hopeful considering that recent business surveys show a further increase in hiring intentions whereas unemployment expectations of households have dropped below their pre-pandemic level. Household intentions to make major purchases over the next 12 months have already increased and this trend should continue on the back of an improved financial situation and reduced income uncertainty.

William de Vijlder, BNP Paribas Chief Economis is interviewed by Anna Edwards and Mark Cudmore on “Bloomberg Markets: European Open” and discusses the delta variant issue and the outlook for economic growth.

Strong US and Eurozone GDP growth in the second and third quarters should be followed by a gradual slowdown. Due to the ‘acquis de croissance’ going into the fourth quarter, the perceived slowdown versus the third quarter could be much bigger than what shows up in the current forecasts. In the US, the current elevated inflation will take time to decline. In conjunction with slowing growth, this could boost the stagflation narrative. Such a depiction of the economic environment seems unwarranted however, considering that inflation should decline further in the first half of next year and that the US economy should continue to grow above potential.  

The 1970s have gone down in history as an era of stagflation, defined as a period of slow or even negative output growth and inflation that is high by historical standards. Two supply shocks in the oil market are considered as a key cause but other factors also played a role. In the course of this year, the lifting of restrictions related to Covid-19 has caused an imbalance between supply and demand, leading to a significant pickup in inflation. There is concern that growth, after being particularly strong, will slow, whereas inflation might stay elevated for longer. This has given rise to comments that stagflation, albeit in a lighter version, could make a comeback. However, this risk seems limited.

A complex interplay between unit labour costs, profit margins and pricing power will determine whether the current increase in inflation will be longer-lasting. Traditionally, in the early phase of a recovery, unit labour costs decline on the back of increased productivity. This should cushion the impact of higher input prices on profit margins. Subsequently, unit labour costs should increase but this does not imply that margins should decline. Given the strength of the growth acceleration, the fact that alternatives for meeting robust demand often do not exist and that going for market share makes no sense when faced with supply constraints, the conditions seem to be met for a rather significant transmission of higher input prices in producer output prices.

Historically, a very close correlation has been observed between cyclical peaks in German economic sentiment –which since the start of the euro more or less coincides with the peak in Eurozone economic sentiment- and the 10 year Bund yield. The latter tends to decline, once the peak in sentiment has been passed. Although other factors also play a role in the dynamics of long-term interest rates, the historical experience is important to keep in mind when assessing the outlook for bond yields.

Usually during recovery phases following a recession, it takes quite some time before inflationary pressures begin to appear. Yet the 2020 recession was atypical, and the recovery is proving to be just as unusual. Growth should receive abnormally strong support in the quarters ahead. What if price acceleration was not temporary, contrary to the reassuring comments of the Fed’s monetary policy committee members?

In countries where restrictions on mobility are lifted, demand picks up suddenly, causing an imbalance with supply, which takes more time to react, in particular when value chains are long and complex. In recent months, companies have been reporting longer delivery lags and rising input costs, but the historical experience in the US and the euro area shows that the impact on inflation should be temporary and limited. Nevertheless, in bond markets, break-even inflation has increased significantly in recent months, reflecting investor worries about the risk of upside surprises to inflation. Should supply-side pressures ease in coming months, one would expect break-even inflation to decline as well.

In the debate on economic policy in the United States, some observers warn we may be back to the seventies. It was a period of severe shocks – move to floating exchange rates, two major oil crises –, high and accelerating inflation and an increased role for the State.

The ‘great inflation’ of the 1970s had many causes. The policy objective of full employment had already led to high inflation by the end of the 1960s. Two oil shocks and the depreciation of the dollar caused additional increases. The key factor was monetary policy, which was not adapted to the circumstances. It reflected the view that the Fed did not have a mandate to tolerate the sizeable increase in unemployment that might have ensued from the aggressive tightening needed to bring inflation under control. In addition, inflation was considered to be a cost-push phenomenon that could be addressed with wage and price controls. Today’s situation is very different. The Federal Reserve is an independent central bank and inflation expectations are well-anchored. However, letting the economy run hot is reminiscent of the 1960s.  Should inflation be above target for too long, the Federal Reserve will need to have the courage to tighten policy sufficiently despite the potential cost to the economy.

How does doing trade with the United Kingdom look like in a post-Brexit world? A few months after the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EU and the UK came into force on 1 January 2021, what is its impact on companies trade and the economy as a whole? What can Belgian corporates with interests in the UK expect in the future? My colleague Simon Gates and myself are sharing our insights in this video.