William De Vijlder

Companies in the euro area report record-high levels of labour shortages. These are partly cyclical in nature but structural factors also play a role. Last year’s annual investment survey of the European Investment Bank shows that the availability of staff with the right skills is the second most important factor weighing on long-term investment decisions in the EU. Structural labour shortages can weigh on potential GDP growth through its impact on capital formation, innovation and productivity. Economic and in particular education policy including vocational training and lifelong learning schemes will have to make sure that, going forward, the available skills, both in quantity and quality, fit the evolving needs.

In the euro area, business surveys report record-high staff shortages. They represent a headwind to growth and raise the possibility of faster wage growth and a pick-up in inflation. Thus far, growth of negotiated wages has been subdued but, given its historical relationship with labour market bottlenecks, an acceleration seems likely. Despite the difficulties of companies in filling vacancies, labour market slack has remained above pre-pandemic levels. This situation should improve in the coming months but whether this eases labour market tensions depends on companies’ hiring intentions. Based on recent surveys, these should remain elevated.

A recent academic paper argues that, considering the significant recent decline of consumer expectations, the US could be entering recession. However, Covid-19 complicates the interpretation of household confidence data. Fluctuations in infections play a role and the recovery from last year’s recession as well as other factors have caused a jump in inflation. Given the historically high quits rate, the weakening in household sentiment probably reflects mounting concern about the impact of inflation on spending power. Something similar has been observed in the latest consumer confidence data for France.

Although the forecasts from the IMF’s latest World Economic Outlook paint a quite favourable picture, there is unease about the distribution of risks. Risks to real GDP growth are tilted to the downside, a key factor being new Covid-19 variants that could hit countries with low vaccination levels particularly hard. Growth would also suffer if the increase in energy prices were to continue. Inflation risks on the other hand are skewed to the upside. Supply-demand mismatches may last longer than expected and the energy shock could cause second round effects. As a consequence, there is great uncertainty about the inflation outlook. Central banks will need to be patient, waiting for inflation to trend down, but also vigilant and ready to act if necessary. Their messages will be followed closely by financial markets, which, until now, have reacted in a calm way to the increase in inflation.

Successful market timing between equities and cash requires high skill levels. Very low official interest rates, through their impact on market rates, create a disincentive for doing market timing because they increase the break-even skill level. The same applies for quantitative easing. These considerations are important from a financial stability perspective. Growing investor reluctance to do market timing will probably lead to a decline in equity market volatility and an increase in equity valuations. The former provides a false sense of safety whereas the latter increases the sensitivity to negative news and hence increases the riskiness.

Recent data show business and consumer sentiment has peaked and real GDP growth is expected to slow down whilst
remaining well above potential. A key factor in this respect is the self-reinforcing interaction between spending, company
profits and employment, against a background of easy monetary and financial conditions. In using the popular metaphor,
until recently, the economic sky looked quite blue but clouds have been gathering. The message of central banks should
become a bit more hawkish, in the US, political disagreement influences the economic agenda of the Biden administration
and China is going through a major adjustment phase. Most importantly, supply bottlenecks continue to weigh on growth
whereas the jump in gas and energy prices is raising concerns that inflation might stay high for somewhat longer.

When the pick-up in inflation during a growth upswing is driven by the demand side, inflation is considered to be good. However, inflation can also be bad. In that case, higher prices do not follow from e.g. higher wages due to a tight labour market. Bad inflation rather reflects supply-side shocks. This is, to some degree, the situation that is unfolding in the Eurozone and other economies due to the recent huge increase of oil and gas prices. Bad inflation weighs on households’ real disposable income and hence spending. The impact is expected to be larger for households at the lower end of the income distribution, considering that a bigger portion of their expenditures goes to fuel and in particular heating, and that they also have a lower savings rate.

Judging by recent survey data, it seems many advanced economies are hitting against their speed limit in terms of economic growth. This has several consequences. It creates upside risks to inflation, something which is acknowledged by the Federal Reserve and the ECB. Labour shortages can cause faster wage growth but they should also underpin consumer confidence and spending. Supply bottlenecks should boost company investments. However, when growth is at the speed limit, future economic volatility may increase. Finally, it also creates an analytical challenge in understanding whether softer business surveys are demand or supply driven.

Annual inflation has reached 5.3% in the US in June. Its drivers are still very concentrated but there is concern that they will spread. Anecdotal evidence is accumulating that price pressures faced by companies are increasing. Price pressures as reported in the ISM survey send the same signal. Historically, they have been highly correlated with producer price inflation and consumer price inflation but the transmission depends on factors such as pricing power, competitive position, labour market bottlenecks, etc. The next several months will be crucial for the Federal Reserve and for financial markets, considering the Fed’s conviction that the inflation increase should be temporary. The bond market has bought into this view thus far but, going forward, its sensitivity to upside surprises to inflation should be higher than normal.

A conjunction of developments has led in the first semester of the 2021 to a global improvement in business and consumer sentiment in advanced economies. Vaccination campaigns gathered speed while the number of new infections declined. Monetary policy support also played a part as well as fiscal policy. International trade and capital flows created international spillover effects which led to a sizeable improvement in the assessment of export orders.

A combination of positive developments has led in the first half of the year to a broad-based improvement in business and consumer sentiment in advanced economies: successful vaccination campaigns, a declining number of new infections, ongoing policy support and positive international spillover effects. Gradually, the ‘mechanical’ recovery in sectors which previously had suffered from restrictions is expected to lose steam. Supply bottlenecks and certain price increases may end up acting as a headwind. The growth cycle, despite a gradual slowdown, is far from over but neither is the fight against Covid-19. There is increasing concern that new variants would lead to precautionary behaviour, thereby weighing on certain spending categories. This concern has already triggered a significant decline in bond yields, despite concerns that in the US inflation might stay higher for longer. It also means that central bank policy guidance will be a key point of attention in the second half of the year.